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THE IsSUE of the comprehension process of Ll indirect speech acts has 
long been debated among philosophers, linguists, and psychologists (cf. 
Levinson, 1983; Bach & Hamish, 1979). Specifically, their debates have been 
centering on the role of literal sentence meaning in processing indirect speech 
acts performed in native languages: is the intended illocutionary force of the 
indirect speech act identified indirectly from its literal sentence meaning or 
directly from the locution without interpreting its literal meaning first? An 
attempt has also been made to explicate the role of literal meaning in 
comprehending idioms and metaphors in native language situations both 
theoretically and empirically (cf. Gibbs, 1980, 1982, 1986; Ortony et al., 1978; 
Swinney & Cutler, 1979; and others). 
Here, a question arises as to how the same issue has been treated in the 
area of comprehension of L2 nonliteral utterances. Are L2 learners 
comprehending nonliteral utterances made in their target language in the same 
manner as native speakers? Are L2 learners computing the literal sentence 
meaning in comprehending L2 nonliteral utterances? 
In this paper, an attempt will be made, first, to review how researchers 
have been dealing with the ways in which a hearer is said to arrive at his/her 
interlocutor's intention when the latter is making nonliteral utterances-indirect 
speech acts, idioms, and a metaphors-in both L1 and L2 situations. Then, in 
the subsequent section, I will make a further attempt to present a design for a 
study of comprehension process of L2 nonliteral utterances in order to deepen 
our understanding in this area. 
Review of the Literature 
In an effort to attain a comprehensive review of literature in this area, I 
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will adopt the following strategy for this section. First, the major models of the 
comprehension process of L1 indirect speech acts, idioms, and metaphors, and 
empirical evidence of comprehension of those L1 nonliteral utterances will be 
reviewed. Then, an examination will be attempted of how the current issue has 
been dealt with in the literature of L2learning. Finally, a further attempt will 
be made to explore how the comprehension of L1 /L2 nonliteral utterances can 
be accounted for within the framework of an automatic/ controlled processing 
model (cf. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
Studies of Comprehension of Ll Nonliteral Utterances 
Much of the recent research on comprehension of nonliteral utterances has 
revolved around the theoretical claim that the hearer can derive the speaker's 
intended meaning either through Conversational Principles (Grice, 1968, 1975), 
Conversational Postulates (Gordon & Lakoff, 1971, 1975), or the rules of speech 
acts (Searle, 1975). These theorists share the view that the hearer must first 
process the literal meaning of a nonliteral utterance to determine whether or 
not it is compatible with various contextual conditions and conversational rules 
(Grice's Conversational Principles or Gordon & Lakoff's Conversational 
Postulates). If it is not, the hearer must attempt further processing to arrive at 
the speaker's intention. The crucial point here is whether the hearer actually 
processes the literal sentence meaning first in comprehending indirect speech 
acts, idioms, or metaphors. 
A substantial number of experimental psychologists have been dealing 
with this issue. Based on their experiments on the processing of those 
nonliteral utterances, some psycholinguists evidenced that the literal 
interpretation of a nonliteral utterance is always computed before the conveyed 
meaning is drived and have established a model called the Literal First Model 
(cf. Gibbs, 1982) or the Serial Processing Model (cf. Reeder & Wakefield, 1987). 
This model, therefore, entails four stages, which will be described below using 
an utterance "Can you tell me the time?'' (taken from Clark & Schunk (1980)). 
First, the literal meaning of the utterance is determined ("Do you have the 
ability to tell me the time?''). Second, the hearer must decide if the literal 
meaning is the intended meaning of the speaker. Third, if there is a conflict 
between the literal meaning and the specific context, the hearer has to compute 
the conveyed meaning ("Tell me the time.") through a cooperative principle or a 
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conversational postulate. Finally, the hearer uses the utterance based on its 
conveyed meaning. According to this model, then, the hearer is supposed to 
take longer to verify nonliteral utterances than literal ones due to the 
processing of the literal meaning before deriving the intended meaning. 
Other researchers, however, strongly rejected the above four-stage model 
and proposed the following two alternatives based on their research findings. 
One is the Multiple Meaning Model (cf. Gibbs, 1982) where the literal and 
nonliteral meanings of a nonliteral utterance are simultaneously computed 
during comprehension. To be more specific, a request like "Can you tell me the 
time?'' has both a literal meaning ("Do you have the ability to tell me the 
time?") and a nonliteral meaning ('Tell me the time."); and its literal meaning 
can be taken seriously along with its nonliteral meaning. Thus, under this 
model, the hearer is assumed to respond to the literal meaning and the 
nonliteral meaning atone time, as in "Yes, I can- it's six o'clock." In sum, the 
Multiple Meaning Model predicts that there should be some residual left over 
from the literal processing that took place, even if it was not related to the 
utterance's conveyed meaning. 
The other alternative is the Conventional Meaning Model (cf. Gibbs, 1982) 
or the Direct Processing Model (cf. Reeder & Wakefield, 1987) where the 
conventional meaning of a nonliteral utterance is examined first during 
comprehension before any possible literal interpretation is attempted. 
Specifically, the nonliteral utterance, "Can you tell me the item?", has the 
conventional illocutionary force, "Tell me the time," which is directly retrieved 
from the locution, without having to determine its literal meaning first. Hence, 
it is assumed, according to this model, that the hearer can immediately 
understand the conventional illocutionary force. In what follows, then, 
empirical evidence supporting the validity of each model presented above will 
be provided more specifically, according to the type of nonliteral utterance, i.e., 
indirect speech acts, idioms, and metaphors, respectively. 
Indirect speech acts. Quite a number of studies of the comprehension of 
indirect speech acts have been undertaken, in particular, since the 1970s. 
Oark & Lucy (1975) afford strong support for the validity of the Literal First 
Model. Following the claim of Gordon & Lakoff (1971, 1975), Clark & Lucy 
tested three predictions in analyzing indirect requests. Prediction 1 is that the 
hearer should show evidence of having processed the sentence literally. 
Prediction 2 is that the hearer should take longer to understand indirect 
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requests than direct requests. The third prediction is that the hearer should 
show evidence that his final representation of a sentence is its intended 
meaning. The subjects were presented with indirect requests, such as "Must 
you make the circle blue" and "Why not color the cirlce blue," and were 
required to verify, based on the colored circles actually presented along with 
the sentences, whether direct and indirect, positive and negative requests had 
been fulfilled. The response times were compared across those indirect 
requests. Clark & Lucy confirmed the three predictions (though they were 
not able to test Prediction 2 directly), claiming that the hearer computes the 
literal meaning of a sentence before deriving the indirect meaning. 
Clark (1979) later modified his view and provided some evidence for the 
Multiple Meaning Model. Clark (1979) conducted a series of experiments in 
which ordinary requests for information, such as "Could you tell me the time 
you close tonight?", were made of local merchants on the telephone. He found 
that hearers used six sources of information in making their responses to those 
indirect requests. These included (1) conventionality of means; (2) 
conventionality of forms; (3) special markers like 'please'; (4) transparency of 
the indirect meaning; (5) implausibility of the literal meaning; and (6) the 
speaker's imputed plans and goals. According to Clark, the hearer used this 
information in judging whether the literal meaning was intended seriously 
(and thus the response should be made with "Yes," as in "Yes. It's six."), as well 
as whether the indirect meaning was intended. Since the data evidenced the 
responses including "Yes," Clark concluded that hearers process both the literal 
and nonliteral meanings of a nonliteral utterance simultaneously during their 
comprehension task. Similar findings were also reported by Munro (1977, 
1979) in his interview observations on the UCLA campus by requesting the 
time of day. 
Focusing on the role of politeness in how a hearer chooses his response to 
an indirect request, Clark & Schunk (1980) conducted four experiments, which 
provided further evidence of the Multiple Meaning Model. The basic 
assumption of their study was that the more a request's literal meaning benefits 
the hearer, the more polite the request is and thus the more polite response 
could be elicited. From this, Clark & Schunk argue as follows: "people 
ordinarily compute both the literal and the indirect meanings of indirect 
requests. They must if they are to recognize when the speaker is and isn't being 
polite, and if they are to respond politely, impolitely, or even neutrally." (p. 
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Some researchers, however, have cast doubt on the validity of evidence 
for the above two models and claim that the Conventional Meaning Model or 
Direct Processing Model provides a more relevant account for the process of 
indirect speech act comprehension. Among them, Schweller (1978) in his three 
experiments on the comprehension and recall of direct and indirect requests 
presented conflicting evidence of Predictions 1 and 2 tested by Clark & Lucy, 
asserting that "the hearer uses syntactic 'cues' to arrive at an immediate 
understanding of the conventional utterance's illocutionary force without the 
necessity of elaborate inferential processing." (p. 61) 
As one of the proponents of the Conventional Meaning Model, Gibbs 
(1979, 1983) also claims that the findings of Clark & Lucy cannot be considered 
definitive for the Literal First Model because the target sentences were 
presented with no preceding context (This was also pointed out by Schweller 
(1978)). With attention duly paid to the presentation of relevant contexts, Gibbs 
(1979, 1983) conducted a series of experiments on whether people must first 
process the literal meaning of an indirect request before deriving its conveyed 
meaning. Specifically, in his 1979 study, Gibbs provided subjects with specific 
context paragraphs ending either indirect request sentences, literal use of the 
same sentences, or direct request sentences. After each paragraph story, 
subjects made a paraphrase judgment for those last sentences. The results of 
this study indicated that conventional indirect requests take no longer to read 
than either literal sentences or direct requests when appropriate social and 
linguistic contexts are provided. [The same findings were yielded in his 1983 
study; and his 1981 study showed that the high degree of conventionality of a 
request and its context entails shorter processing time.] 
Gibbs also points out that the absence of appropriate context overshadows 
the validity of the findings of Clark (1979) and Clark & Schunk (1980). 
According to Gibbs (1982, 1983, 1984), however, the more serious blow to Clark 
and Clark & Schunk is the possibility that the subjects in those studies simply 
responded conventionally to those conventional indirect request, rather than 
their computing the literal meaning of the sentence at some point during 
comprehension. Specifically, regarding Clark (1979), Gibbs refers to the fact 
that, in response to the indirect request "Would you mind telling me what time 
you close?", people usually begin their responses with "Yes" (as in "Yes, we 
72 TAKAHASHI 
close at six"), instead of "No" (see also Munro (1977, 1979) for the same claim). 
With regard to Clark & Schunk (1980), Gibbs extrapolates that their results may 
be due to people knowing what are conventionally polite responses to 
conventional requests. Taken together, Gibbs claims that literal-first and 
multiple-meaning comprehension models are not accurate accounts of the 
processing of indirect requests. 
In support of the Conventional Meaning Model, then, the central claim of 
Gibbs (1979, 1982,1983, 1984) can be summarized as follows: 
All indirect speech acts can be viewed along a conventionality 
continuum. Then, if the indirect speech acts are conventional 
and performed in a given appropriate pragmatic context, people 
are usually able to comprehend the intended meaning "directly" 
and we can even observe the tendency that people are 
automatically biased toward the conventional, nonliteral 
interpretation of indirect speech acts. In this sense, an analysis 
of a sentence's literal meaning is not an obligatory process. In 
the case of comprehending novel and nonconventional kinds of 
language use, however, people are required to make more 
elaborate inferencing to arrive at the speaker's intention. 
It is noteworthy to recall Reeder & Wakefield (1987) here. In their study, 
3- and 4-year olds were directly considering the nonliteral interpretations of 
requests and offers; they relied more on the contexts (especially, 3-year olds); 
and they showed a bias toward the nonliteral interpretation. In short, Reeder 
et al. successfully exemplified main points of Gibbs' central claim presented 
above. 
Idioms. In an effort to understand the comprehension process of idioms, 
Gibbs and his colleagues have also undertaken a series of studies and have 
provided a similar claim to the above just presented for indirect speech acts, 
supporting the Conventional Meaning Model in processing idioms. Before 
these latest studies were attempted, however, two general processing models 
had dominated in the area of idiom comprehension. 
The first of these, which is called the Idiom List Hypothesis, claims that 
idioms are stored in a special list which is not part of the normal lexicon. 
Access to this list takes place during comprehension through a special idiom 
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mode of processing (Bobrow & Bell, 1973; cf. Swinney & Cutler, 1979). The 
basic assumption of this hypothesis is that a literal analysis is always attempted 
on a word string before an idiom mode of processing activates. Bobrow & Bell 
(1973) examined this hypothesis using a perceptual set paradigm and 
confirmed that a special idiom mode of processing is undertaken after the literal 
analysis in the course of idiom comprehension. Hence, the idiom processing 
based on this hypothesis supports the Literal First Model. 
The second model is called the Lexical Representation Hypothesis. This 
hypothesis holds that idioms are stored and retrieved from the lexicon like any 
other word (hence, there is no special idiom list nor any special processing 
mode). This hypothesis assumes that computation of both idiomatic and literal 
meanings is simultaneously initiated as soon as a hearer catches the first word 
in the idiom string. This assumption was verified by Swinney & Cutler (1979) 
in their study on subjects' judgment time of semantically well-formedness of 
idiom strings and nonidiom (literal) strings in English; and thus, their results 
are taken as support for the Multiple Meaning Model. 
As briefly referred to earlier, Gibbs (1980, 1985, 1986) and Mueller & Gibbs 
(1987) have succeeded in verifying the validity of the Conventional Meaning 
Model, resulting in the confliction with the above two models. Specifically, in 
the Gibbs' 1986 study, for instance, subjects were asked to read idiomatic 
expressions in either literal or idiomatic or unrelated story contexts. Then, 
Gibbs measured the reading time of the subsequent target paraphrase 
sentences. The results suggest that people do not compute the literal 
interpretations of idioms either before or simultaneous to comprehending their 
figurative meanings. Furthermore, the following tendency was also confirmed: 
people are automatically biased toward interpreting literal uses of idiomatic 
expressions conventionally, as idioms, before deriving their intended literal 
meanings. The other Gibbs' studies (Gibbs, 1980, 1985; Mueller & Gibbs, 1987) 
share the same results as Gibbs (1986). Taken together, then, Gibbs' studies 
have also made a great contribution to the verification of validity of the 
Conventional Meaning Model for idiom processing. 
Furthermore, evidence for this model is also available through Schweigert 
(1986) and Schweigert & Moates (1988), which suggest that the figurative 
meaning of familiar idioms is processed first before the literal meaning though 
less familiar idioms take longer time for processing than the familiar ones. 
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Metaphors. Several studies have been reported as empirical evidence of the 
Conventional Meaning Model in the processing of metaphors (Ortony et al., 
1978; Pollio et al., 1984; and others). Among them, Ortony et al. (1978) 
conducted an experiment in which reaction times for understanding target 
sentences or phrases were measured in terms of a preceding (short or long) 
context. Their results showed that only in the short context did subjects take 
significantly longer to comprehend metaphorical than literal targets, enabling 
them to contend that context effects, again, play a significant role in metaphor 
processing. 
As for the Multiple Meaning Model for metaphor processing, Glucksberg 
et al. (1982) succeeded in providing evidence for this model. Glucksberg el al. 
hypothesized that the metaphorical interpretation would take place 
instantaneously and suppress a literal interpretation based on the assumption 
that the understanding of metaphors and literals involves identical 
cognitive/inferencing processes. Using an analogue to the Stroop color-
naming word interference technique, they traced the fact that subjects 
processed both literal and nonliteral meanings of sentences simultaneously. 
Janus & Bever (1985), however, questioned the validity of the claims made 
by Ortony et al. and Glucksberg et al. above by referring to some 
methodological problems seen in those studies. The problem with Ortony et al. 
(and also Gibbs' studies, according to them) is that they measured reading time 
at the end of target sentences although looking at processing times within 
sentences at the boundaries of constituent units might be more likely to reveal 
the most significant differences between metaphoric and literal sentences in 
terms of latencies for comprehension. With regard to Glucksberg et al., Janus 
& Bever point out the absence of context as a major methodological problem. 
The Janus & Bever study, which included appropriate contexts and 
selected relevant points for measuring processing times, then yielded the 
findings of longer reading times for metaphors than for literals. Needless to 
say, this lends support to the Literal First Model. 
In summary, a large number of studies have been undertaken with a view 
to clarifying the role of literal meaning in L1 nonliteral comprehension. Three 
models have been proposed and supported empirically by several experimental 
studies. While I cannot conclusively sort out which model can most relevantly 
account for the current issue due to the methodological problems inherent in 
those studies, I can definitely make a claim for the role played by 
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conventionality of contexts and of nonliteral utterances themselves in nonliteral 
comprehension, on the whole. 
Studies of Comprehension of L2 Nonliteral Utterances 
Little research has been done to explore how L2 learners arrive at the 
intention of a speaker who is making a nonliteral utterance in their target 
language. As a matter of fact, many more efforts have been made for the other 
areas of indirectly conveyed meaning: the ability of L2 learners' inferencing 
presupposition as compared to assertion (Carrell, 1977, 1978) or in comparison 
with implication (Carrell, 1984), and L2 learners' ability to interpret 
implicatures in cross-cultural settings (Bouton, 1988). 
By asserting the significance of a study exploring nonliteral 
comprehension in interlanguage, Marcum (1986) attempted to examine the 
ways in which learners are said to make inferences about indirect speech acts 
during conversation through the review of selected literature in 
sociolinguistics, applied linguistics, and social psychology. Marcum implies 
that L2 learners are surely confronting some difficulties arising out of the 
differences in processing strategies closely related to sociocultural conventions 
in interpreting various indirect speech acts (cf. van Dijk, 1977). 
Learners' difficulties in comprehending L2 indirect speech acts are also 
empirically substantiated by Carrell (1981). In comparison with Clark & Lucy 
(1975), Carrell measured the correctness (not the response latency attempted by 
Clark & Lucy) achieved by L2 learners in understanding indirect requests with 
a focus on the polarity (positive/negative) of the conveyed meaning of those 
requests. Carrell succeeded in tracing some potentially difficult areas for L2 
learners in their interpreting those requests as compared to native speakers' 
comprehension reported in Clark & Lucy. 
Despite the significance of this study, however, Carrell failed to answer 
the question of how learners understand L2 nonliteral utterances, which has 
been the central issue of psycholinguistic research in this area of L 1 as 
reviewed above. Furthermore, due to following Clark & Lucy, Carrell did not 
present relevant contexts in her experiment; and thus, the validity of her claim 
is questionable (cf. Gibbs, 1979, 1981, 1983). As summarized above for L1 
studies in this area, conventionalities of both context and nonliteral utterances 
play a crucial role in tracing the illocutionary forces of those utterances. In 
this regard, it has been expected that L2 studies incorporate these two factors 
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for the current issue. Some interlanguage studies presented below have 
responded to our expectation. 
Based on van Dijk's (1979) model of an analysis of the given context and 
the theoretical discussion about the comprehension of indirect speech acts, 
Kasper (1984) set up four predictions for L2leamers' pragmatic comprehension. 
These predictions manifest the interactions between a set of conventionalities of 
context and indirect speech acts and processing strategies (bottom-up and top-
down processings). Her analysis of an L2 learner's responses to a native 
counterpart's indirect speech acts in role-play settings lends support to at least 
one of the four predictions above: L2 learners identify illocutionary force by 
means of a multiple-meaning procedure (i.e., combination of the Literal First 
Model and the Multiple Meaning Model) with bottom-up processing, as 
opposed to a one-meaning procedure (i.e., Conventional Meaning Model) with 
top-down processing, when the native counterparts perform nonconventional 
indirect speech acts (hints) in a given context manifesting low conventionality 
as perceived by the learners. 
However, Kasper's explanation of the L2 learners' performance of 
nonliteral comprehension is not persuasive enough since she failed to provide 
experimentally-controlled empirical bases for claiming that subjects are 
actually employing a multiple-meaning procedure with bottom-up processing 
or a one-meaning procedure with top-down processing. Nevertheless, her 
framework of "processing preferences under various constellations of 
conventionality" (p. 7, emphasis mine) surely provided a new perspective for 
studies of L2 nonliteral comprehension. 
Similar results to those obtained by Kasper (1984) are reported by Ervin-
Tripp, Strage, Lampert, and Bell (1987) in their studies on indirect requests 
(hints) comprehended by children in both L1 and L2 situations. They intended 
to test the difference between two models of indirect requests here. One is a 
literal interpretation model claiming that processing of requests starts from a 
literal interpretation of what is said, followed by a check with context. The 
other is a contextually-based model, which assumes "hearers start from the 
situation, project normal activities for their role, process language enough to 
identify contextual referents and check incongruity with the projected action, 
but analyze immediate speaker intention only under special conditions such as 
irrelevance or incongruity." (p. 107) According to Ervin-Tripp et al., those 
children (native/nonnative) tended to rely on literal processing when the 
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nonconventional indirect requests were performed in nonconventional, less 
recognizable contexts. 
However, their primary finding was that children could immediately 
recognize speakers' intentions conveyed by nonconventional indirect requests 
when those requests were attempted in conventional, more recognizable 
contexts; and thus, they supported the contextually-based model. For this 
situation, Kasper (1984) predicted in exactly the opposite way: learners 
comprehend nonconventional indirect speech acts performed in highly 
conventionalized contexts by means of a multiple-meaning procedure, instead 
of an immediate recognition process (i.e., one-meaning procedure). As Reeder 
& Wakefield (1987) claim, younger children tend to take more context-oriented 
processing strategies in interpreting Ll requests and offers due to their reduced 
linguistic knowledge, whereas older children show their favor of relying on 
linguistic elements in their speech act comprehension. Since Kasper's L2 
learners are adults (personal communication), the difference between Kasper 
(1984) and Ervin-Tripp et al. (1987) could be explained by Reeder & Wakefield's 
extrapolation of a developmental shift in speech act comprehension strategy 
from an early more context-based approach to a later, more heavily text-
dependent approach due to continuing development of linguistic awareness. 
Including the possibility of transfer from Ll processing strategies, further 
studies will be needed to clarify the nature of L2 nonliteral comprehension by 
both adults and children. 
Finally, the difference in idiom processing between native and nonnative 
speakers will be reviewed. Focusing on both high and low familiarity idioms, 
Schraw, Trathen, Reynolds & Lapan (1988) examined the role of lexicalization 
in native and nonnative idiom comprehension. They found that native 
speakers understood both high and low familiarity idioms as lexicalized units 
while nonnatives did not. Specifically, nonnative speakers tried to understand 
obvious uses of idioms as if they were novel utterances, most likely using a 
word-by-word lexical analysis of the idiomatic phrases. Schraw et al. then 
concluded that, to nonnative speakers, most idioms are not lexicalized and 
lexical chunks are not realized in their lexical memory. 
In summary, the studies of L2 nonliteral comprehension presented above 
suggest that there are some differences in processing those nonliteral 
utterances between native and nonnative speakers (or between adults and 
children) and that the conventionalities of context and nonliteral utterances, 
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again, have played a crucial role in nonliteral comprehension. However, in 
order to grasp the process of L2 nonliteral comprehension in a more dear-cut 
manner, well-designed experiments as carried out by L1 experimental 
psycholinguists should be conducted. 
Nonliteral Comprehension and Automatic/Controlled Processes 
Since Schneider & Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin & Schneider (1977) provided 
a putative source of evidence for automaticity through their experiments, the 
notions of automatic process and controlled process have been playing a central 
role in explicating the nature of human information processing and have 
influenced many psychologists or computer scientists in their theory 
development (Anderson, 1982; Cheng, 1985; Neves & Anderson, 1981; Shiffrin 
& Dumais, 1981; and others). The concept of automaticity has also been 
adopted by SLA researchers and has made a great contribution to their theory 
constructions concerning the nature of the process of L2learning (see Bialystok, 
1979,1981,1982,1983, 1988; Faerch & Kasper, 1984; Goodman, Haith, Guttentag 
& Rao, 1985; McLaughlin, 1978, 1988; McLaughlin, Rossman & McLeod, 1983; 
McLeod & McLaughlin, 1986; Nation & McLaughlin, 1986; Sharwood Smith, 
1981; van Patten, 1984). 
In this section, based on the previous review of the literature on nonliteral 
comprehension, an attempt will be made to explore how the comprehension of 
Ll/L2 nonliteral utterances can be explained by the notion of automaticity. I 
will undertake the current task on the basis of the automatic/ controlled 
processes defined by Schneider & Shiffrin (1977). This is because their 
processing model is judged to explicate more relevantly the process of 
nonliteral comprehension as compared to other models, such as Bialystok's 
(1982, 1988) model consisting of the Analyzed and Automatic dimensions, 
which is intended to account for language proficiency or the control of language 
from a psycholinguistic point of view. Schneider & Shiffrin (1977) define an 
automatic process and a controlled process as follows: 
An automatic process can be defined within such a system as the 
activation of a sequence of nodes with the following properties: (a) 
The sequence of nodes (nearly) always become activated in response 
to a particular input configuration, where the inputs may be 
externally or internally generated and include the general situational 
context. (b) The sequence is activated automatically without the 
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necessity of active control or attention by the subject (i.e., capacity-
free) ... Since an automatic process operates through a relatively 
permanent set of associative connections in long term store, any new 
automatic process requires an appropriate amount of consistent 
training to develop fully ... A controlled process is a temporary 
sequence of nodes activated under control of, and through attention 
by, the subject. Because active attention by the subject is required, 
only one such sequence at a time may be controlled without 
interference, unless two sequences each require such a slow 
sequence of activations that they can be serially interwoven (i.e., 
capacity-limited). (pp. 2-3, last two parentheses are mine) 
It has already been understood that the conventionality of nonliteral 
utterances and that of context play a crucial role in a hearer's arriving at a 
speaker's intention. Hence, the following four possible combinations of 
nonliteral utterance and context can be set up in terms of conventionality: 
(1) Nonconventional nonliteral utterances in nonconventional contexts. 
(2) Conventional nonliteral utterances in conventional contexts. 
(3) Nonconventional nonliteral utterances in conventional contexts. 
(4) Conventional nonliteral utterances in nonconventional contexts. 
With regard to nonconventional nonliteral utterances in nonconventional 
contexts, most researchers, including the proponents of the Conventional 
Meaning Model, agree that those utterances require some elaborate inferencing 
strategies on the part of hearers. Hence, a literal analysis is considered to be 
made due to the nature of serial processing required for such inferencing. Since 
information processing of this kind seems to be highly capacity-limited, hearers 
are expected to use controlled processing in comprehending those nonliteral 
utterances. 
Regarding conventional nonliteral utterances in conventional contexts, 
researchers have been seen debating over the processing of the literal meaning 
of those utterances. As Rumelhart (1979) claims, there may be no fundamental 
difference in information processing between conventional and 
nonconventional nonliteral utterances. The only difference is that, as a result of 
routinization of associative connections in long term store, most of the 
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conventional nonliteral utterances are chunked, which does not require any 
analytical procedures. Hence, when a conventional nonliteral utterance is 
made in the related (conventional) context, a hearer is expected to 
automatically chunk the message in response to the particular input 
configuration in that context. Therefore, it is reasonable to account for 
conventional nonliteral utterances in conventional contexts under the notion of 
automatic process. 
In respect to nonconventional nonliteral utterances in conventional 
contexts and conventional nonliteral utterances in nonconventional contexts, 
the automaticity of processing of those utterances is determined by the degree 
of conventionality of the particular context perceived by the hearer based on 
his/her experience. Thus, it is probable that, while nonconventional nonliteral 
utterances are automatically processed, certain conventional utterances require 
controlled processing, depending on the perceived conventionality of that 
particular context by the hearer. 
The same account could be made of the comprehension of L2 nonliteral 
utterances. The only differences between native speakers and L21earners on 
this issue seem to be speed (cf. Lehtonen & Sajavaara, 1983) and accuracy in 
processing those nonliteral utterances. In respect to 'speed', as Schraw et al. 
(1988) report, nonnative speakers are more likely to fail to lexicalize idioms and 
thus show relatively slow processing of those nonliteral utterances. To put it 
another way, they have difficulty in chunking even the most conventionalized 
forms of language use. The similar observation is made by Lehtonen & 
Sajavaara (1983). They explicate that, in processing L2 idioms, learners try to 
resort to their explicit knowledge of the grammatical structures of the L2 as 
taught in the classroom. Regarding learners who have acquired their target 
languages in natural learning contexts, however, Lehtonen et al. fail to show 
how those learners process L2 idioms. Referring to the classroom learning 
contexts, they further argue that "the learner's tendency to rely on structural 
properties is reinforced by what might be called instructional bias." (p. 120, 
emphasis mine) This implies that learners who have not received any 
instruction might show a different processing style. Further research should be 
needed to clarify this point. 
With regard to 'accuracy' in processing L2 nonliteral utterances, Carrell 
(1981) indicates that there are certain linguistic areas in which L2learners make 
more inaccurate analyses as compared to native speakers in their 
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comprehension task (e.g., sentences with negative polarity). In the end, these 
differences in processing speed and accuracy are assumed to invite a serious 
communication breakdown between native speakers and L2 learners; and thus, 
it is most desirable that L2leamers develop automaticity in comprehending L2 
nonliteral utterances. 
In order to attain reasonable automaticity in L2 comprehension, however, 
L2 learners are expected to achieve at least the following two goals. The first 
goal is familiarity with both convention of usage and meaning convention 
(Morgan, 1978); and thus, learners are expected to cultivate sociocultural 
awareness in this regard (Gibbs, 1982; Marcum, 1986; cf. Blum-Kulka, 1983; cf. 
Gumperz, 1982). It should be noted that, if all else is equal, learners who have 
sufficient knowledge of the TL's sociocultural conventions are assumed to 
surpass others in terms of automaticity of L2 comprehension. 
The second goal is the achievement of advanced linguistic skills which are 
good enough for learners to be able to make processing decisions automatically 
(Lehtonen & Sajavaara, 1983). Likewise, if all else is equal, it is assumed that 
advanced learners are more likely to process nonliteral utterances automatically 
(as chunked information) than beginning and intermediate learners. In reality, 
however, the situations would be more complex than assumed here because 
both the first and second goals above seem to be closely related to (1) learners' 
language aptitudes (aptitude factor) and (2) their motivations to learn the target 
languages (motivational factor). 
Regarding the aptitude factor, Skehan (1989) points out the strong 
relationship between aptitude and achievement of advanced linguistic skills 
(the second goal) by arguing that aptitude is consistently the most successful 
predictor of second language achievement. [Note that the same claim is made 
by Gardner (1980); and see also Spolsky (1989).] Furthermore, referring to 
sociolinguistic competence, one of the four components of a model of 
communicative competence proposed by Canale & Swain (1980) and Canale 
(1983), Skehan claims that some "aptitudes would probably concern a 
sensitivity by some people to appropriate language use and social norms (the 
first goal)" (p. 47, parentheses mine). Though Skehan's claim on the 
relationship between aptitude and sociolinguistic competence should be 
empirically verified, it is reasonable to conclude here that the aptitude factor is 
closely related to the accomplishment of the above two goals. 
With regard to the motivational factor, the intergroup theory of SLA could 
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provide a relevant base for associating the motivational factor with learners' 
achieving the above two goals. The intergroup theory was proposed by Giles & 
Byrne (1982) in their attempt to specify conditions for speech accommodation 
in an interethnic context. This theory claims that learners with their 
motivational tendency 'integrative' would "take advantage of available 
informal acquisition contexts to further their L2 skills and would, besides 
formal knowledge, gain high oral competence, sociolinguistic mastery, and 
accommodative flexibility in L2 as well as favorable nonlinguistic outcomes in 
the form of positive attitudes toward the outgroup and cultural enrichment" 
(Beebe & Giles, 1984, p. 14). Hence, while empirical evidence of this 
theoretical claim should be explored, it is highly predictable that the 
motivational factor would greatly affect both learners' familiarizing themselves 
with the TL's sociocultural conventions of language use (the first goal) and their 
achieving advanced linguistic skills (the second goal). In view of the possible 
involvement of the two major factors (i.e., aptitude and motivational) in 
learners' attaining the above two goals, therefore, I can conclude that the issue 
of automaticity in L2 learning should be treated from the broader perspectives. 
Swnmary and Conclusion 
In an effort to understand the nature of comprehension of nonliteral 
utterances-indirect speech acts, idioms, and metaphors, I have reviewed the 
literature in this area first for Ll and subsequently for L2 situations. With 
regard to the comprehension of Ll nonliteral utterances, three major models-
the Literal First Model, the Multiple Meaning Model, the Conventional 
Meaning Model-and empirical evidence for each model have been identified. 
The current issue of the role of literal meaning in tracing illocutionary forces is 
still controversial. 
The foregoing review of second language literature in this area revealed 
that little effort has been made to treat the issue of how L2leamers arrive at the 
speaker's intention when the latter is making a nonliteral utterance in their 
target language. Yet, a small number of studies dealing with this issue suggest 
that there are some differences in comprehending nonliteral utterances between 
natives and nonnatives. 
The most significant finding through the current review of both Ll and L2 
literature is that the conventionality of nonliteral utterances and the 
conventionality of contexts are interacting with each other and play a crucial 
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role in the comprehension of nonliteral utterances. As Ortony et al. (1978) 
suggest, conventionality, not literality, might be the key feature in determining 
the ease of comprehension of nonliteral utterances. 
Subsequently, an attempt has been made to account for the relationship 
between nonliteral comprehension and automaticity based on the 
conventionalities of utterance and context. On the whole, it could be predicted 
that conventional nonliteral utterances in conventional contexts are most likely 
to be understood automatically, whereas nonconventional nonliteral utterances 
in nonconventional contexts are considered to require the controlled process. 
For L2 comprehension, however, it is assumed that the situations would 
become more complicated due to sociocultural and linguistic factors involved 
in second language learning. In order for learners to attain more efficient 
communication in the second language, therefore, empirical studies of the 
process of L2 nonliteral comprehension and automaticity in L2 comprehension 
should be explored systematically and substantially. 
DESIGN FOR THE STUDY OF COMPREHENSION PROCESS OF L2 
NONLITERAL UTIERANCES 
Purpose of this Study 
The most significant finding of the literature review is that the 
conventionality of nonliteral utterances and the conventionality of contexts as 
perceived by a hearer in the realization of a particular nonliteral utterance both 
play a cruical role in the comprehension of nonliteral utterances. Four possible 
combinations of nonliteral utterances and contexts in terms of conventionality 
were identified in relation to the degree of automaticity in processing those 
nonliteral utterances: (1) Nonconventional nonliteral utterances in 
nonconventional contexts (controlled process); (2) Conventional nonliteral 
utterances in conventional contexts (automatic process); (3) Nonconventional 
nonliteral utterances in conventional contexts (automaticity undecided); and (4) 
Conventional nonliteral utterances in nonconventional contexts (automaticity 
undecided). These combinations offer an ideal framework for the study of 
nonliteral comprehension. 
Within this framework, the current study investigates the combination of 
(2) above with a focus on Japanese learners of English comprehending indirect 
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requests performed in English, as compared to native speakers of English. To 
be more specific, this study is intended to examine whether Japanese learners 
of English process the literal sentence meaning first or trace the intended 
meaning directly from the locution when comprehending English conventional 
indirect requests performed in conventional contexts. It should be noted that 
conventional indirect requests here are defined as requests which are 
conventionally or standardly used by the members of a particular speech 
community (cf. Bach & Harnish, 1979; Schweller, 1978; Searle, 1975; and others) 
and manifest both convention of usage and meaning convention (Morgan, 1978) 
(e.g., "Can you give me a drink?"). 
The above goal will be attained by following the experimental design 
developed by Gibbs (1983). In order to determine how indirect requests are 
processed, response time will be measured when a subject reads a particular 
indirect request and its subsequent paraphrased target sentence, respectively. 
Both will be displayed on a CRT (cathode-ray tube). In comparison with the 
response time obtained from native English speakers, it is expected that I can 
also assess the relative level of automaticity attained by those Japanese learners 
of English in comprehending indirect requests. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
The research question of this study is: are Japanese learners of English 
relying on literal processing to a greater extent than native speakers of English 
when comprehending English conventional indirect requests in the same 
contexts and thus showing the lesser degree of automaticity in comprehending 
those requests as compared to native speakers? 
Based on Ervin-Tripp et al. (1987), Kasper (1984), Marcum (1986), 
Lehtonen & Sajavaara (1983), and Schraw et al. (1988), the following hypothesis 
will be tested: 
Japanese learners of English rely on literal processing to a 
significantly greater extent than native speakers in comprehending 
English conventional indirect requests. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
The Experimental Group in this study will consist of Japanese learners of 
English (N = 36, minimum). They should have intermediate to advanced levels 
of proficiency in English (TOEFL score 500 or above). Note that the relatively 
high English proficiency is required for them to judge as quickly as possible 
whether English sentences displayed on a CRT screen are meaningful or not. 
Native speakers of English (N = 36, minimum) will serve as Control-Group 
participants. 
Materials 
Twelve stories will be written with a mean length of six lines for each. 
Each story will contain conversations ending with a prime sentence, such as 
ucan•t you be friendly?u (taken from Gibbs (1983, p. 526)). Among these twelve 
stories, six stories (A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1) will induce request 
interpretations and present the conventional context relative to the realization 
of a particular request type. Each conventional context will therefore be 
followed by a pragmatically appropriate conventional indirect request as a 
prime sentence. The other six stories (A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2) are intended 
to induce literal interpretations of the prime sentences. 
The stories marked with the same letter (e.g., A-1 and A-2) will share the 
prime sentences in forms (but not in functions). To put it another way, stories 
A-1 and A-2 will end with the same prime sentence, such as "Can't you be 
friendly?", though the story contexts are different. 
Each story will be further followed by a target sentence. This is either a 
sentence which paraphrases the prime sentence's indirect interpretation (a 
request), a literal paraphrase of the prime sentence (a statement or a question), 
or a meaningful sentence which is unrelated to the prime sentence. Each target 
should consist of the same number of words. The components of materials for 
this study are presented in Figure 1 using Group-A stories as an example. 
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Figure 1 
Components of Materials (Case of Group-A Stories) 
Story A-1 
Conventional 
request context 
Request 
(e.g., Can't you 
be friendly?) 
I L 
I= Indirect 
L =Literal 
Un 
Un =Unrelated 
Story A-2 
Literal 
context 
Question 
(e.g., Can't you 
be friendly?) 
I L Un 
Three other stories will be written to serve as fillers. Those filler stories 
have the same components as the above experimental stories. However, the 
target sentences in these stories are not meaningful English sentences. In 
addition, two other stories will also be prepared to serve as practice items. The 
filler and practice stories will not be included in the data analysis. For all 
stories to be written for this study, attention should duly be paid to create a 
story context which could be encountered in both Japanese and American 
societies so that unfamiliarity of a story context will not affect response times. 
Following Gibbs (1983), two preliminary studies will be undertaken for 
the construction of the main study. The first preliminary study will be 
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conducted in order to ensure that the stories actually induce indirect (request) 
or literal interpretation of the prime sentences. Native English speakers and 
Japanses learners of English who will not take part in the main study (N = 30, 
min. for each language group) will be asked to read all of the stories written for 
this study, including filler and practice stories. For each story, they will be 
asked to judge whether a final sentence (i.e., a prime sentence) conveys an 
indirect (request) meaning or a literal meaning. 
The second preliminary study is concerned with target sentences (indirect, 
literal, or unrelated). Since the response times of the target sentences are also 
measured and compared across subjects and materials to determine the ways of 
processing the preceding prime sentences (see below for more details), an 
independent sentence-classification task (Gibbs, 1983, p. 527) will be conducted in 
advance, using native English speakers who will not participate in the main 
study (N = 30, min.). The purpose of this preliminary study is to ensure that 
there are no significant differences between response times to make the 
sentence-classification judgment for the three target types when those targets 
are provided without any preceding contexts and prime sentences. The 
subjects will be asked to read word strings (i.e., indirect, literal, unrelated target 
sentences) presented on a CRT and to decide as quickly as possible whether 
they constitute meaningful or correct English sentences. Response times to 
make this judgment will be measured and compared for each target condition. 
Design and Procedure 
Six different sets of materials (Sets 1- 6) will be constructed. Each subject 
(a Japanese learner of English or a non-Japanese speaking native English 
speaker) will be randomly assigned to read one of these six. Each set will 
consist of six experimental stories, three filler stories, and two practice stories. 
Among the six experimental stories, three stories will be conventional-context 
request stories ending with a conventional indirect request (Condition X), and 
three will be literal-context stories ending with a literal sentence (a statement or 
a question) (Condition Y). In each condition, one story will be followed by an 
indirect target, one by a literal target, and one by an unrelated target. Each 
story will be arranged in a way that it will occur equally often in each of the 
three target conditions across the six sets of materials. Furthermore, the 
presentatin order of the stories within each set will be counterbalanced across 
the six sets of materials. 
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The data will be organized according to Figure 2. The design will involve 
the following three independent variables: (1) prime type (two levels: 
conventional indirect requests in conventional contexts -literal sentences in 
literal contexts); (2) target type (three levels: indirect -literal- unrelated); and 
(3) nationality (two levels: Japanese speakers learning English- native English 
speakers). The primes and targets are crossed within subject. The dependent 
variable in this study is the response time for processing a target sentence. 
Hence, repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOV A) procedure will be 
adopted. 
Figure 2 
Schematically represented data organization 
Indirect Requests 
_______________ (Primes) 
(Primes). ____ _ 
Uteral Sentences 
Indirect Literal Unrelated Indirect Literal Unrelated 
(Targets). ___________ (Targets) 
(Nationality) 
Japanese 
ESL 
English 
Natives 
Subjects will be tested individually. Each story (as a stimulus) will be 
presented on a CRT with one sentence at a time under the control of a 
computer, which will record all response latencies. 
When the first sentence of a story appears, subjects will be told to read the 
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sentence and push the designated key as soon as they have understood it. 
When this is done, the first sentence will disappear. Then, the second sentence 
of the same story will be displayed on the screen. The subjects will be 
instructed to read each sentence in this manner. After they have read the final 
sentence of the story (i.e., a prime sentence), they will be provided with a 
certain signal (either aurally or visually); and the target string will appear on 
the screen. The subjects will be instructed to read the word string (i.e., the 
target sentence) and press a certain designated key if the word string is 
understood as a meaningful English sentence conveying the meaning of the 
final sentence in the story and another designated key if it is not (Sentence 
Classification Judgment Task). When this is done, that word string will 
disappear; and the first sentence of the next story will be presented on the 
screen. [Note that response times will be measured for a prime sentence and its 
subsequent target sentence only.] 
The rationale for this design should be provided here using the example 
taken from Gibbs (1983) (see Appendix). Suppose that a subject has read a 
literal target sentence ("Are you be able to act friendly?") after reading an 
indirect request ("Can't you be friendly?") (a prime sentence) in an indirect 
request story. If the subject computes the literal interpretation of the indirect 
request, then, there should be some facilitation for his/her response to the 
literal target sentence during the sentence classification judgment. In other 
words, shorter response time can be observed for the literal target in comparison 
with the other two target conditions. If there is no facilitation as compared to 
the response times of the indirect target ("Please be friendly to other people.") 
and the unrelated target ("Running is excellent for the heart."), it is doubtful 
that the subject computes the literal meaning of that indirec request in 
comprehension process. If some facilitation is detected here, then, it is probable 
that the subject also processes the literal meaning of that indirect request. 
Data Analysis 
Three-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOV A) will be 
performed with primes and targets as (2x3) within-subject factors, and with 
nationalities as a between-subject factor. The alpha decision level will be set at 
a < .05 (one-tailed, directional). Furthermore, all assumptions for the ANOV A 
will be checked. 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY AND PERSPECTIVES 
It is expected that findings of this study will clarify some aspects of 
comprehension process of L2 nonliteral utterances: the role of literal meaning 
in processing those utterances, and the level of automaticity attainable by L2 
learners in nonliteral comprehension and so on. Then, it could be suggested 
here that future studies on L2 nonliteral comprehension involve the other 
combinations of conventionalities of nonliteral utterances/contexts (see the 
Review of Literature for more details). In other words, the effects of 
conventionalities of L2 nonliteral utterances and contexts and the interaction of 
those two factors should thoroughly be investigated. Furthermore, 
developmental aspect of comprehension process of L2 nonliteral utterances 
should also be shed light on by examining the processing performance of 
beginning, intermediate, and advanced L2leamers, respectively. 
It should be emphasized, however, that the studies outlined above will 
still fail to provide a whole picture of comprehension process of nonliteral 
utterance. As a matter of fact, in both Ll and L2 situations, a substantial 
number of issues related to nonliteral comprehension remain to be resolved. 
Referring toLl nonliteral comprehension, Gibbs (1983) raises two important 
questions that remain to be answered. One is when and where literal meaning 
is computed; and the other is how people actually process the conventional 
meanings of nonliteral utterances, in particular those of indirect requests. It 
goes without saying that those two questions are applicable to L2 nonliteral 
comprehension. 
Furthermore, the issue of automaticity in the process of Ll/L2 nonliteral 
comprehension has not been studied systematically and substantially. In fact, 
neither foregoing experimental studies nor the study presented here is 
designed to examine whether or to what extent or how people chunk the 
information. Resolution of this issue as well as those addressed above awaits 
further research. It is hoped that our further research efforts in this area will 
eventually enable us to overcome the still formidable barriers that exist in our 
understanding the nature of nonliteral comprehension and verbal 
comprehension process, in general. 
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APPENDIX 
Example of Story Contexts and Their Target Sentences 
(taken from Gibbs (1983, p. 526)) 
Indirect story 
Mrs. Norman was watching her kids play in the backyard. 
One of the neighbor's children had come over to play. 
But Mrs. Norman's kids refused to share their toys. 
This upset Mrs. Norman. 
She angrily walked outside and said to one of her children, 
"Can't you be friendly?" 
Indirect: Please be friendly to other people. 
Literal: Are you able to act friendly? 
Unrelated: Running is excellent for the heart. 
Literal story 
Rod was talking with his psychiatrist. 
He was having lots of problems in establishing relationships. 
"Everyone I meet I seem to alienate," Rod said. 
"I just tum very hostile for no reason," he continued. 
The shrink said, 
"Can't you be friendly?" 
Uteral: Are you unable to act friendly? 
Indirect: Please be friendly to other people. 
Unrelated: Running is excellent for the heart. 
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